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I. INTRODUCTION
“[W]e are just one race here. It is American.”1 Justice Scalia’s
concurrence in Adarand v. Pena (Adarand III)2 supported the view that
equal protection under the Constitution requires that all people are
treated equal, without regard to race. Justice Harlan first articulated this
view over 100 years ago, in his 1896 dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.3
With his famous words “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” Justice Harlan’s view was
forward-looking at the time, but still resonates today.4
Recently, state and local governments have implemented
affirmative action programs in the employment context.5 One type of
affirmative action program is race-based, with the goal of ensuring
equality so that our nation’s racially biased history does not repeat.6 But,
1 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
2 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5 See e.g. H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2010); N. Contracting
Inc., v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007); Jana-Rock Constr. v. New York, 438
F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2006); W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th
Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000);
Tenn. Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Geod Corp. v. N.J. Transit
Corp., 678 F. Supp. 2d 276 (D.N.J. 2009).
6 See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 474
(1986) (“The purpose of affirmative action is not to make identified victims whole, but
rather to dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent
discrimination in the future.”)
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the Supreme Court has shown concern that these programs have gone too
far and that there are ways to ensure equal opportunity for all without
taking race into consideration.7 Therefore, to achieve true equality, the
Court requires that race-based affirmative action programs, “imposed by
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” 8 In other words, federal, state,
and local governments must only implement racial classifications if
supported by a compelling reason, such as eliminating purposeful
discrimination, and must design their programs specifically to address
that reason.9
The review of government affirmative action programs has been a
source of controversy for several decades.10 In Richmond v. Croson,11
the Supreme Court required that a reviewing court apply strict scrutiny to
state affirmative action programs.12 The Court then expanded its Croson
analysis in Adarand III, where the Court held that a reviewing court must
analyze any federal or state race-based affirmative action program under
strict scrutiny.13
In 1982, the federal government implemented an affirmative action
program for minority-owned businesses.14 Congress reauthorized the
program several times, most recently as the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21) in 1998 and as the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU or “the Act”) in 2005.15 The Act requires state and local
7 See id. at 476 n.48; see also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507
(1989) (“There is no evidence in this record that the Richmond City Council has
considered any alternatives to a race-based quota.”)
8 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227.
9 See id.
10 The confusion started in 1978, in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,
where Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny, but only Justice White joined him in this part
of the opinion. 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Next, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, six Justices
affirmed the set aside program, but could not agree on the level of scrutiny to be applied.
448 U.S. 448, 483, 495, 518 (1980). Three justices argued for strict scrutiny and three
concurring justices argued for intermediate scrutiny. Then, in Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, the plurality employed strict scrutiny. 476 U.S. 267, 279–80 (1986). In
Richmond v. Croson, a majority confirmed a strict scrutiny standard of review, but only
for state programs. 488 U.S. 469, 490–93 (1989). In Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, the
Court applied intermediate scrutiny for benign federal racial classifications. 497 U.S.
547, 564–65 (1990).
11 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
12 Id. at 490–93.
13 See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227.
14 See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat.
2097 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 23, 26 U.S.C.).
15 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. No. 105-178,
112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 23, 49 U.S.C.); Safe,
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recipients of federal transportation funds to operate affirmative action
programs, specifically, Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)
programs, mandating that each state spend ten percent of those funds
with socially and economically disadvantaged individuals when
contracting for transportation projects within the state.16 The purpose of
SAFETEA-LU, according to the United States Department of
Transportation (USDOT or DOT), is to “ensure nondiscrimination in the
award and administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” “create a level
playing field on which DBEs can compete fairly,” “help remove barriers
to the participation of DBEs in DOT-assisted contracts,” and “provide
appropriate flexibility to recipients of Federal financial assistance in
establishing and providing opportunities for DBEs.”17
Four circuits have reviewed the constitutionality of TEA-21,18 but
no circuit has reviewed the constitutionality of SAFETEA-LU.19 These
circuits addressed subcontractor’s challenges under the Fourteenth
Amendment that the state statutes implementing the federal requirements
are either facially unconstitutional20 or are unconstitutional as-applied21
to them.22 The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, agreed that TEA-21

Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 2, 5, 6, 15, 16, 19, 21, 23, 26, 31, 33, 42, 45, 49 U.S.C.).
16 119 Stat. at 1156.
17 49 C.F.R. § 26.1 (2011).
18 See N. Contracting Inc., v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2007); W. States
Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v.
Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater
(Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000). For the purposes of this Comment,
because the circuits reviewed the constitutionality of TEA-21, this previous name will be
used when discussing the circuit cases, but otherwise this note will refer to the most
recent act, SAFETEA-LU.
19 The Fourth Circuit reviewed a North Carolina statute that mirrors the SAFETEALU statute in H.B. Rowe Co. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2010), but has not
explicitly reviewed the constitutionality of the federal SAFETEA-LU statute.
20 A successful facial challenge requires the plaintiff show the law is unconstitutional
in every application. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct.
1184, 1190 (2008).
21 In an as-applied challenge, a successful plaintiff need only show that the statute is
unconstitutional as-applied specifically to that plaintiff. Richard A. Fallon, Jr., AsApplied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1327
(2000).
22 See N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 720; W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 995;
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 972; Adarand IV, 228 F.3d at 1182.
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was facially constitutional.23 The Supreme Court, however, has not
decided the facial constitutionality of TEA-21 or SAFETEA-LU.24
Three circuits reviewed as-applied constitutional challenges and
utilized the reasoning in Croson and Adarand III to TEA-21, resulting in
a circuit split.25 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits permit as-applied
challenges, requiring a state to demonstrate that it narrowly tailored its
program.26 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that a state is not
susceptible to an as-applied challenge because the state is an agent of the
federal government and is not susceptible to challenge outside of the
state exceeding its federal authority implementing the program.27
This Comment shows that a state’s DBE program for federallyfunded state projects must be subject to strict scrutiny as articulated in
Croson and Adarand III.28 States should not be immune to Fourteenth
Amendment as-applied challenges, despite compliance with the federal
statute and regulations for DBE programs established pursuant to
SAFETEA-LU. Part II describes SAFETEA-LU and the constitutional
authority of the Act. This part also defines the strict scrutiny standard as
articulated by Croson and Adarand III. Part III discusses the current
circuit split between the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Part IV
analyzes the approaches of the Circuits and argues how the Supreme
Court should resolve the split. This Comment concludes that a state
DBE program, pursuant to SAFETEA-LU, is not immune from
constitutional attack, but rather must be subject to strict scrutiny analysis
in line with Croson and Adarand III, identifying its own compelling
interest and narrowly tailoring its DBE program to achieve that interest.
23 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 995; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 972;
Adarand IV, 228 F.3d at 1182.
24 Only Gross Seed and Sherbrooke Turf petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court from the Eighth Circuit, but it was denied. Gross Seed Co. v. DOT, 541
U.S. 1041 (2004); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 541 U.S. 1041 (2004).
25 See infra Part III.
26 See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971 (“[A] valid race-based program must be
narrowly tailored, and to be narrowly tailored, a national program must be limited to
those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed. To
the extent the federal government delegates this tailoring function, a State’s
implementation becomes critically relevant to a reviewing court’s strict scrutiny. Thus,
we leave this question of state implementation to our narrow tailoring analysis.”); W.
States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997–98 (“We also agree with the Eighth Circuit that it is
necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry into whether Washington’s DBE program is
narrowly tailored . . . . Whether Washington’s DBE program is narrowly tailored to
further Congress’s remedial objective depends upon the presence or absence of
discrimination in the State’s transportation contracting industry.”).
27 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721 (“Our holding . . . that a state is insulated
from this sort of constitutional attack, absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal
authority, remains applicable.”).
28 See infra Part IV.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. SAFETEA-LU
1. A Federal Transportation Affirmative Action Statute
SAFETEA-LU requires that at least ten percent of the money made
available by the Secretary of Transportation for its programs “shall be
expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals.”29 USDOT specified
regulations for participation by disadvantaged business enterprises in
USDOT transportation financial assistance programs.30 The regulations
require each recipient31 of federal transportation funds to implement a
DBE program that complies with SAFETEA-LU.32
To qualify as a DBE, a firm must be owned and controlled by a
majority of individuals who are “socially and economically
disadvantaged.”33 The federal government presumes certain ethnic
groups to be socially and economically disadvantaged, including Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific
Americans, Subcontinent Asian Americans, as well as women.34 The
state can rebut this presumption if the firm owner’s personal net worth
exceeds $1.32 million.35 Furthermore, individuals not presumed socially
and economically disadvantaged can apply for DBE certification, and the
state must determine on a case-by-case basis if the individual qualifies.36
The state makes the determination based on a number of factors set forth
in the regulations, but generally determines whether an individual is
socially disadvantaged if he has “been subjected to racial or ethnic
prejudice or cultural bias within American society. . . .”37 Moreover, the
state determines whether an individual is economically disadvantaged if
he is a “socially disadvantaged individual[] whose ability to compete in
the free enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital
and credit opportunities as compared to others in the same or similar line
of business who are not socially disadvantaged.”38
29

TEA-21 § 1101(b)(1) (1998).
See 49 C.F.R. § 26 (2011).
31 In the context of this note, recipients of federal transportation funds will be
referred to generally as the “state.”
32 49 C.F.R. § 26.21(a).
33 Id. § 26.5 (definition of DBE).
34 Id. § 26.21(a)(1).
35 Id. § 26.67(b).
36 Id. § 26.67(d).
37 Id. § 26 app. E.
38 49 C.F.R. § 26 app. E.
30
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The regulations specify that the ten percent DBE utilization
requirement established by the SAFETEA-LU statute is merely an
“aspirational goal at the national level.”39 The statutory goal “does not
authorize or require recipients to set overall or contract goals at the 10
percent level, or any other particular level.”40 Rather, each recipient is
required to set an overall DBE participation goal.41 The overall goal
must allow participation by all certified DBEs and the state must not
break down the goal into race, gender, or other categorical groups.42
The regulations promulgate a two-step process for determining the
relative availability of DBEs in order to set an overall goal.43 The first
step is to determine a base figure for the relative availability of DBEs, of
which the regulations list proposed approaches, including using DBE
Directories and Census Bureau Data, bidders’ lists, or conducting a
disparity study.44 Second, the recipient must determine if it is necessary
to adjust the base goal.45 The adjustment is based on a number of
factors, including the “capacity of DBEs to perform work” such that the
final goal reflects the percentage of funds that the state will allocate to
DBEs in the forthcoming fiscal year.46
After determining its final goal, the state must project the portions
of the overall goal that it expects to meet through race-neutral and raceconscious measures,47 meeting the maximum feasible portion of its goal
by using race-neutral measures.48 The regulations list several raceneutral means, including the use of a defined bidding process, providing
assistance in overcoming inability to obtain bonding or financing, and
assisting DBEs to develop their capability to conduct business
electronically.49 Once the state has determined its goal and its measures
to achieve its goal, the state must send its methodology and evidence
used to arrive at its overall goal to USDOT by August 1 of the preceding
year.50 The goal is in place for the upcoming year and the state regularly
monitors its programs to ensure compliance with the overall goal.51

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. § 26.41(b).
Id. § 26.41(c).
Id. § 26.45.
Id. § 26.45(h).
Id. § 26.45(c), (d).
See 49 C.F.R § 26.45(c).
Id. § 26.45(d).
Id. § 26.45(d), (e).
Id. § 26.45(f)(3).
Id. § 26.51(a).
Id. § 26.51(b).
49 C.F.R. § 26.45(f)(1)(i).
Id. § 26.37.
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Additionally, each state must establish contract-specific goals to
meet any portion of the overall goal that it cannot meet using race-neutral
means.52 The state may only use contract-specific goals in those
federally assisted contracts that have subcontracting possibilities.53
Similar to the overall goal, the contract-specific goals “must not be
subdivided into group-specific goals.”54 Contract-specific goals must
cumulatively result in meeting any portion of the overall goal the state
projected having to use race-conscious means.55 The state must also
adjust its contract-specific goals in order to ensure that the state
continually narrowly tailors its program.56
2. Constitutional Authority of SAFETEA-LU
The constitutional basis for SAFETEA-LU stems from Congress’s
Spending Power.57 This Article I authority empowers Congress to “lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States.”58 “Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds.”59 The conditional receipt gives the recipient a
choice to either accept the condition or forego the federal funding.60 This
“Spending Power allows Congress to achieve its policy goals indirectly,
using federal funds to incentivize state action.”61 But, the Court has
placed limits on the federal government’s authority to induce the state to
act.62 For example, Congress must have a clear statement of its
stipulation and must condition the receipt of funds unambiguously,
“enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences of their participation.”63 Further, Congress must relate
the conditions “to the federal interest in a particular national project or
program.”64
52

Id. § 26.51(d).
Id. § 26.51(e)(1).
54 Id. § 26.51(e)(4).
55 Id. § 26.51(e)(2).
56 49 C.F.R. § 26.51(f).
57 Ross R. Fulton, “Our Federal System”: States’ Susceptibility to Challenge When
Applying Federal Affirmative Action Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 687, 689 (2007).
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
59 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
60 Fulton, supra note 57, at 690.
61 Id. at 688.
62 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
63 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)
(alteration in original)).
64 Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
53
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B. The Equal Protection Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action
Programs in Government Contracting
Two Supreme Court cases are fundamental in determining the level
of scrutiny a reviewing court should apply when determining the equalprotection constitutionality of a government-created affirmative action
program: Richmond v. Croson65 and Adarand v. Pena (Adarand III).66
Croson confirms that a reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny for
state or local race-based programs.67 Adarand III expanded Croson and
requires strict scrutiny review for federal programs.68
1. State Affirmative Action Programs: The Croson Standard
The Supreme Court held in Richmond v. Croson that state or local
affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny analysis.69 In
1983, the city of Richmond adopted the Minority Business Utilization
Plan (“the Plan”), which required prime contractors to subcontract at
least thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract with Minority
Business Enterprises (MBEs).70 Minorities included black, Spanishspeaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut persons.71 The Plan
permitted waivers of the thirty percent set-aside requirement for
exceptional situations when the prime contractor proved that it could not
meet the requirements of the Plan.72 In September 1983, J.A. Croson
Company (Croson), a prime contractor, challenged the constitutionality
of the Plan after the city denied its waiver of the thirty percent set-aside
requirement.73
The Court held that the Plan was unconstitutional.74 The Court
began its analysis stating that a state or its local subdivision has authority
to eradicate the effects of discrimination within its own jurisdiction, so
long as it is exercised within the constraints of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment.75 The Court determined that Richmond’s plan
denied certain citizens the opportunity to compete for public contracts

65

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
67 Croson, 488 U.S. at 490–93
68 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227..
69 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–96.
70 Id. at 477.
71 Id. at 478
72 Id.
73 Id. at 483.
74 Id. at 511.
75 Croson, 488 U.S. at 491–93 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
66
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based solely upon their race.76 The Court applied strict scrutiny to
Richmond’s plan.77
In the compelling interest analysis, the Court concluded that
Richmond made a generalized statement that there had been past
discrimination in the contracting industry.78 Specifically, Richmond
could not tie the thirty percent quota to any specific injury suffered by
anyone.79 Additionally, none of the city’s findings, “singly or together,
provide the city of Richmond with a ‘strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action was necessary.’”80 The Court further
explained that states and their subdivisions cannot consider national
findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of fields, but
rather must identify specific discrimination within their own jurisdiction
before employing race-conscious relief.81 The Court stated that the
inclusion of specific groups of which there was no evidence of
discrimination suggested that the Richmond’s purpose was not in fact to
remedy past discrimination, but rather a haphazard plan.82
The Court had difficulty assessing whether Richmond narrowly
tailored the Plan because the city failed to identify specific
discrimination.83 The Court explained that in order to use race-based
measures, the city should have first determined whether alternative raceneutral measures could be successful to increase minority-owned
business participation.84 The Court also stated that there was no apparent
reason for a thirty percent quota when the city considered bids on a caseby-case basis.85 The Court concluded that Richmond likely used the
quota for administrative convenience.86
Croson further articulated the measures that could be sufficient to
survive strict scrutiny analysis. First, the Court stated that an inference
of discrimination could arise by the showing of a “statistical disparity
between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to
perform a particular service and the number of contractors actually
engaged by the locality or the locality’s prime contractors.”87 Thus, in an
76

Id. at 493.
Id. at 493–95.
78 Id. at 498.
79 Id. at 499.
80 Id. at 500 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986)
(plurality opinion)).
81 Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
82 Id. at 506.
83 Id. at 507.
84 See id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 508.
87 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
77
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extreme case, a narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary.88
Second, the Court stated that when there are “racially motivated refusals
to employ minority contractors,” the city would be justified in providing
appropriate relief to the victim of discrimination.89 Statistical evidence
of a pattern of individual discriminatory acts may support a local
government’s determination that broader remedial relief is necessary.90
Third, the Court acknowledged that the city could employ a variety of
race-neutral measures to increase the opportunities for small contractors
of every race.91
2. Federal Affirmative Action Programs: The Adarand III Standard
In addition to holding that strict scrutiny applied to local and state
governmental actors, the Supreme Court also held that strict scrutiny
applied to federal governmental actors in Adarand III.92 In 1989,
Adarand Constructors (Adarand) submitted the lowest bid to the general
contractor, Mountain Gravel & Construction Company (Mountain
Gravel), for the guardrail subcontract on a USDOT project.93 USDOT
was subject to the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1987, which required it to spend at least ten percent of
its funds with socially and economically disadvantaged businesses, as
defined by the Small Business Act (SBA).94 The SBA presumed social
and economic disadvantage for certain minority groups, such as Black,
Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native Americans.95
The USDOT contract stated that Mountain Gravel would receive a
monetary bonus for giving subcontracts to businesses owned by socially
or economically disadvantaged individuals.96 Adarand was not certified
as such a business and was denied the contract in favor of a business
owned by a socially or economically disadvantaged individual.97
Adarand brought suit alleging that the SBA presumption of social or
economic ownership discriminates based on race and violates equal
protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.98

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id. at 205, 209.
Id. at 205.
Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 205–06.
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The Court analyzed whether the Fifth Amendment provides the
same protection as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.99 The Court relied on Croson and held that “all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”100
The Court reasoned that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect
persons, not groups and therefore, there is no distinction between racial
discrimination cases brought under either amendment.101
The
Constitution prohibits all government action based on race, a group
classification, or requires the government to implement a program
narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest to ensure that
the government does not infringe upon the right to equal protection.102
The Court remanded the case to the lower court to apply strict
scrutiny.103
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT: IS A STATE’S DBE PROGRAM SUBJECT TO AN ASAPPLIED CHALLENGE?
Generally, the circuits agree that TEA-21, SAFETEA-LU’s
predecessor, is facially constitutional and does not violate equal
protection under the Fifth Amendment.104 The circuits disagree,
however, whether a state is subject to an as-applied equal protection
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.105 In the post-Adarand III
era, there is a circuit split between the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth

99

Id. at 213.
Id. at 227.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 237.
104 See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater (Adarand IV), 228 F.3d 1147, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000).
105 Compare N. Contracting Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Our
holding in Milwaukee County Pavers that a state is insulated from this sort of
constitutional attack, absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority,
remains applicable.”), with W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997–98 (“We also agree
with the Eighth Circuit that it is necessary to undertake an as-applied inquiry into whether
Washington’s DBE program is narrowly tailored . . . . Whether Washington’s DBE
program is narrowly tailored to further Congress’s remedial objective depends upon the
presence or absence of discrimination in the State’s transportation contracting industry.”),
and Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971 (“[A] valid race-based program must be
narrowly tailored, and to be narrowly tailored, a national program must be limited to
those parts of the country where its race-based measures are demonstrably needed. To
the extent the federal government delegates this tailoring function, a State’s
implementation becomes critically relevant to a reviewing court’s strict scrutiny. Thus,
we leave this question of state implementation to our narrow tailoring analysis.”).
100
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Circuits regarding as-applied challenges.106 The Seventh Circuit held
that a state is not susceptible to an as-applied challenge because the state
is an agent of the federal government and is only subject to a challenge if
the state exceeded its federal authority in implementing the program.107
On the other hand, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits permitted as-applied
equal protection challenges, requiring a state to demonstrate that it
narrowly tailored its program to survive strict scrutiny.108 These circuits
agreed that a state’s DBE program must be susceptible to as-applied
challenges in order to ensure that the state applied TEA-21 in a
constitutional manner.109
A. Eighth Circuit: Allowing an As-Applied Challenge
The Eighth Circuit discussed its approach in Sherbrooke Turf, Inc.
v. Minnesota DOT.110 The Sherbrooke Turf decision encompasses cases
from the district courts of Nebraska and Minnesota.111 In the Minnesota
action, Sherbrooke Turf sued the Minnesota Department of
Transportation (MnDOT) and its commissioner.112 In the Nebraska
action, Gross Seed Company (Gross Seed) sued the Nebraska
106 Notably, two additional circuits have decided this question. The circuits include
the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991)
(challenging the 1982 version of the Act), and the Second Circuit in Harrison &
Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (challenging a
1977 version of the Act). The Sixth Circuit has not revisited its position on this matter
post-Adarand III. This distinction is noteworthy because these older decisions relied on
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Milwaukee County Pavers Association v. Fiedler, 922
F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991), which based its authority on Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448 (1980), the established Supreme Court case at the time. Since the Milwaukee County
Pavers decision, Adarand III subsequently overturned Fullilove, applying a stricter
standard of review for race-based classifications in government contracting. Adarand III,
515 U.S. at 236. “”Very recently, the Second Circuit took a brief look at New York’s
DBE program post-Adarand III. In Jana-Rock Construction v. New York, 438 F.3d 195
(2d Cir. 2006), the court did not thoroughly review the program because the contractor
was arguing solely that the state’s definition of “Hispanic” was unconstitutional because
it did not include those persons of Spanish or Portuguese origin. Id. at 200. The court
equated this to an under-inclusiveness challenge and determined that a rational basis
inquiry instead of a strict scrutiny review was appropriate. Id. The court reasoned that
Jana-Rock did not demonstrate that the exclusion was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose and did not challenge the overall constitutional authority of the state’s
affirmative action program. Id. Therefore, while the Sixth and Second Circuits positions
might not have changed since the Adarand III decision, it is outside the scope of this note
to hypothesize how these courts might review their decisions post-Adarand III.
107 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721; Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers Ass’n, 922 F.2d at
423.
108 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971.
109 See W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 998; Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971.
110 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003).
111 Id. at 967.
112 Id.
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Department of Roads (NDOR) and its director.113 The plaintiffs alleged
each state’s DBE program violated equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.114 Sherbrooke Turf and
Gross Seed are white male-owned subcontractor companies that provide
landscaping services for general contractors on federally assisted
highway projects.115 Both MnDOT and NDOR are federally assisted
state highway programs.116 Sherbrooke Turf and Gross Seed lost bids on
highway projects in their respective states due to each state’s DBE
program.117
The Eighth Circuit allowed an as-applied challenge to a state’s
DBE program under TEA-21.118 In considering such a challenge, the
Eighth Circuit required a state to have a narrowly tailored program
subject to strict scrutiny, as ordered by Adarand III.119 The court
reasoned that the national program in place is subject to strict scrutiny,
requiring it to be limited only to those areas of the country where racebased measures are discernibly needed.120 The Eighth Circuit allowed
MnDOT and NDOR to adopt Congress’s compelling interest for
implementing TEA-21, and neither Minnesota nor Nebraska was
required to demonstrate a compelling interest.121 Thus, the court only
reviewed the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny reasoning that the
federal government delegated this prong to the states.122
The court found that the MnDOT and NDOR programs were
constitutional under the as-applied analysis.123 Both states followed the
federal regulations by conducting DBE availability and capability studies
in the highway construction market, setting an annual goal, and
identifying the portion of that goal that required use of race-conscious
means.124 USDOT approved both state programs in 2001.125 In its case,
Sherbrooke Turf attacked the reliability of the data MnDOT used in
determining its annual goal, but the court concluded that Sherbrooke
113

Id.
Id. at 969.
115 Gross Seed Co. v. Neb. Dep’t of Rds., No. 4:00CV3073, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27125, at *3 (D. Neb. May 6, 2002); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, No. 00-CV1026(JMR/RE), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19565, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2001).
116 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 967.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 971.
119 Id. at 969.
120 Id. at 971.
121 Id. at 970–71.
122 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 971.
123 Id. at 973–74.
124 Id.
125 Id.
114
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Turf failed to show that better data was available for Minnesota’s use.126
Instead, the court noted that even though MnDOT could not meet its
overall goal with race-neutral measures, MnDOT adjusted its goals as the
year progressed as required by the regulations.127 Further, the court
identified that NDOR apportioned its contracting to race-neutral
decisions and set an overall goal in compliance with the national
program.128 The Eighth Circuit found both the MnDOT and NDOR
programs constitutional as-applied to Sherbrooke Turf and Gross Seed.129
B. Ninth Circuit: A Similar Eighth Circuit Approach
In Western States Paving Co. v. Washington DOT,130 the Ninth
Circuit heard a challenge from a white male-owned asphalt and paving
subcontractor.131 Western States Paving Company (Western States) sued
the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), the City
of Vancouver, and Clark County, alleging that Washington’s DBE
program violated equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.132 WSDOT receives
federal funding for its transportation projects.133 Western States lost
contracts to minority subcontractors despite presenting lower bids.134
The Ninth Circuit allowed an as-applied challenge to the state’s
DBE program under TEA-21.135 In Western States Paving, the Ninth
Circuit determined that it must follow the Croson/Adarand III standard,
applying strict scrutiny to Washington’s DBE program.136 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the Eighth Circuit, allowing WSDOT to adopt
Congress’s compelling interest.137 The Ninth Circuit focused on the
narrow tailoring prong to determine if Washington’s DBE program could
overcome the as-applied challenge.138 In order for WSDOT’s program to
qualify as a narrowly tailored program, the court required evidence of
past discrimination in the state’s transportation contracting industry and

126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 973.
Id.
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc., 345 F.3d at 974.
Id.
407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 998.
W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 990–91.
Id. at 997.
Id.
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specifically required the program to be “limited to those minority groups
that have actually suffered discrimination.”139
The court found that “Washington’s DBE program closely tracks
the sample DBE program developed by the USDOT.”140 But the court
did not find “any evidence suggesting that minorities currently suffer—
or have ever suffered—discrimination in the Washington transportation
contracting industry.”141 Thus, the court concluded that “Washington’s
application of TEA-21 conflicts with the guarantees of equal
protection . . . .”142
C. Seventh Circuit: No As-Applied Challenges Allowed
The Seventh Circuit differed in its approach to an as-applied
challenge to a state’s DBE program in disagreement with the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits in Northern Contracting, Inc. v. Illinois.143 Northern
Contracting, Inc. (NCI) is a guardrail and fence subcontractor for Illinois
highway construction projects.144 NCI is not a certified disadvantaged
business enterprise.145 The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)
received federal funding from USDOT for its projects and implemented a
DBE program.146 NCI filed an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief against IDOT, its Secretary and Bureau Chief of the Bureau of
Small Business Enterprises, and USDOT, alleging Illinois’s DBE
program violated the equal protection provision under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.147
The Seventh Circuit did not allow an as-applied challenge to the
state’s DBE program implemented under TEA-21.148 The court agreed
with the Ninth and Eighth Circuits allowing a state to rely on Congress’s
compelling interest in implementing a DBE program.149 The court,
however, differed from the Ninth and Eighth Circuits in its reasoning,
limiting its inquiry to whether IDOT complied with TEA-21.150 The
Seventh Circuit did not employ a narrow tailoring inquiry.151 Rather, the
139

Id. at 998.
Id. at 999.
141 Id. at 1002.
142 W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 1002.
143 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007).
144 Id. at 717–18.
145 N. Contracting Inc. v. Illinois, No. 00 C 4515, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3226 at *7
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004).
146 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 717–18.
147 Id. at 717, 719.
148 Id. at 722.
149 Id. at 720–21.
150 Id. at 722.
151 Id. at 722 n.5.
140
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court reaffirmed its pre-Adarand III holding in Milwaukee County
Pavers v. Fiedler152 that a state insulates itself from constitutional attack,
absent a showing that the state exceeded its federal authority.153
Therefore, the court determined that a challenge to a state’s
implementation of a federally mandated program must be limited to the
question of “whether the [state] complied with the federal program
regulations.”154
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by requiring a
state to demonstrate its own compelling interest and implement a
narrowly tailored program in order to survive a strict scrutiny analysis,
remaining true to the Constitution and eliminating race-based programs
in violation of equal protection. States should not be immune to
Fourteenth Amendment as-applied challenges, despite compliance with
the federal statute and regulations for DBE programs established
pursuant to SAFETEA-LU. None of the circuit opinions adequately
account for the strict scrutiny standard as articulated in Croson and
Adarand III for appellate review of government race-based affirmative
action programs. The Seventh Circuit’s position that a state can be
immune from constitutional attack155 violates principles of state
sovereignty and undermines the Croson and Adarand III decisions,
which is to ensure equal protection at every governmental level.156
Additionally, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit approaches advocate for strict
scrutiny but fail to apply the Croson/Adarand III standard.157 These
152

922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991)
N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721; see also Milwaukee Cnty. Pavers, 922 F.2d at
423 (“Insofar as the state is merely complying with federal law it is acting as the agent of
the federal government and is no more subject to being enjoined on equal protection
grounds than the federal civil servants who drafted the regulations . . . . If the state does
exactly what the statute expects it to do, and the statute is conceded for purposes of the
litigation to be constitutional, we do not see how the state can be thought to have violated
the Constitution.”).
154 N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 721–22.
155 Id. at 722.
156 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(requiring race-based programs enacted by every government to be “narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests”); Richmond v. J. A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504–05 (1989) (requiring identification of specific past discrimination
in furtherance of the state government’s compelling interest before a narrow tailoring
analysis can be performed). The Court entertained an equal protection Fourteenth
Amendment challenge in Croson and an equal protection Fifth Amendment challenge in
Adarand III, but the Court held that there is no distinction between claims brought under
either of the two Amendments. Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 213–14.
157 See W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2005);
Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 2003).
153
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circuits do not complete a thorough strict scrutiny analysis, but rather
allow a state to adopt Congress’s compelling interest.158
A. A State DBE Program Cannot be Insulated from Strict Scrutiny
Analysis
The Seventh Circuit’s position that a state is an agent of the federal
government and thus, is not subject to a strict scrutiny analysis is
incorrect and violates state sovereignty. The Seventh Circuit insulated
IDOT from constitutional attack because IDOT was “acting as an
instrument of federal policy.”159 Agency is defined as the “fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent
to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s
behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
assent or otherwise consents so to act.”160 The cornerstone of the
principles of agency is that the principle has the right to control the
actions of the agent.161
In this context, the Seventh Circuit implies that the federal
government, as the principal, enacted the TEA-21 program, and the state,
as the agent, acted on behalf of the federal government, and is subject to
the control of the federal government. This proposition, however,
violates the principles of state sovereignty set forth by the Supreme
Court in New York v. United States162 and Printz v. United States.163 In
those cases, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that the states
are not agents of the federal government, but rather the states are
sovereign actors.164 The Court affirmed its decision in South Dakota v.
Dole165 while acknowledging that Congress could place conditions on the
receipt of federal funds to incentivize state action.166 But, the principle
form New York remained that the “residents of the State retain the
ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply . . . . [S]tate
governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences;
state officials remain accountable to the people.”167

158

W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 997; Sherbrooke Turf Inc., 345 F.3d at 971.
N. Contracting Inc., 473 F.3d at 722.
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01(2006).
161 Id. § 1.01 cmt. c (“The person represented has a right to control the actions of the
agent . . . the principal has the right throughout the duration of the relationship to control
the agent’s acts.”).
162 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
163 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
164 Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
165 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
166 Id. at 206.
167 New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
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The SAFETEA-LU regulations place a condition on the receipt of
funds from USDOT, incentivizing the states to employ a DBE
program.168 If the state were a true agent of the federal government,
however, Congress could instead require the states to perform on its
behalf. But, this is the very principle that New York and Printz expressly
prohibit.169 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the state is
insulated from constitutional attack as an agent of the federal government
is in direct contradiction of the principles of state sovereignty.
Moreover, this approach effectively undermines the purpose of
equal protection under the Constitution. Applying the Seventh Circuit’s
agency principle, the court would not allow a third party subject to a
state’s program to challenge the program’s constitutionality. This
approach is improper because each individual impacted by a government
entity through a race-based program can challenge the program, as the
Supreme Court has stated that “equal protection [is] a personal right.”170
The fundamental purpose of equal protection is to ensure that
government respects the individual right “to be treated with equal dignity
and respect” such that the government does not use race, a group
classification, as the sole criterion in decision-making.171 This requires
the government to treat all people as equal Americans, without regard to
race.172 Instead of continuing to rely on Milwaukee County Pavers, the
Seventh Circuit’s pre-Adarand III decision, the court should have
revisited its position in light of Adarand III.173 Thus, there is no
168

49 C.F.R § 26.21 (2011).
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 925 (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the
States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”
(citations omitted)); New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (“Congress may not simply commandeer
the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)); New
York, 505 U.S. at 162 (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks
the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”).
170 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
171 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
172 See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 213–18.
173 This issue is exemplified in a recent Illinois District Court case which denied a
motion for a temporary restraining order prohibiting IDOT from entering into contract for
repair work. Dunnet Bay Const. Co. v. Hannig, No. 10-3051, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis
29102 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2010). The district court did not revisit the Seventh Circuit’s
position in light of Adarand III, but rather referenced Northern Contracting as precedent.
Id. at *2–3. The court acknowledged that IDOT’s bid process was determined in
accordance with federal SAFETEA-LU regulations and followed procedures as approved
in Northern Contracting. Id. at *2–3. Dunnet Bay argued that IDOT modified its
program by no longer allowing waivers, thereby turning the DBE goal into a rigid quota,
but the court did not look further because it found that Dunnet Bay did not satisfy the
elements for a temporary restraining order. Id. at *10–14.
169
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authority for the Seventh Circuit’s holding based on agency principles.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have applied strict scrutiny in
compliance with Adarand III.
B. Narrow Tailoring Alone is Insufficient to Meet Strict Scrutiny
The Eighth Circuit erred when it allowed Minnesota and Nebraska
to merely rely on Congress’s compelling interest and limited the asapplied review to a narrowly tailored analysis. In Sherbrooke Turf, the
Eighth Circuit analyzed a facial attack on a federal highway program,
concluding that Congress conducted studies finding that there was
widespread intentional discrimination in the contracting industry.174 This
widespread discrimination is akin to general societal discrimination,
which is impermissible under Croson.175
In the context of government contracting, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged only one compelling interest—the need to remedy past,
specific discrimination.176 This compelling interest specifically allows
the government to use a race-conscious remedy when it is necessary to
correct its own unlawful racial classification.177 For example, if a state
department compensates black employees at twenty percent less than it
compensates their white counterparts solely because of race, the state
may correct this past, specific discrimination by raising the salaries of all
black employees.178
174

Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 970–71 (8th Cir. 2003).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
176 Id. at 504. The Court acknowledged a compelling interest in enhancing overall
diversity, but this has been limited to the education context. See, e.g., Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.”). But, this interest is not relevant here. Government contracting is not
concerned with selecting a broadly diverse selection of individual applicants from a
larger pool in order to achieve an “atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation.” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (internal citations omitted). These
education cases are principled on “safeguarding academic freedom which is of
transcendent value to all of us . . . [and] is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court has struck down
several other interests because they were not sufficiently compelling. See, e.g., Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (“The role model theory allows the
Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point required
by any legitimate remedial purpose.”); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (“Petitioner identifies, as
another purpose of its program, improving the delivery of health-care services to
communities currently underserved . . . [, b]ut there is virtually no evidence in the record
indicating that petitioner’s special admissions program is either needed or geared to
promote that goal.”).
177 Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring).
178 Id. at 524.
175

2011]

RACE-BASED GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

437

But, if the government’s only goal is to remedy a long history of
general racism, the Court will not find a compelling purpose and the
government’s program will not survive strict scrutiny analysis.179
Specifically, the Court has stated its concern that including racial groups
in DBE programs that have never suffered from specific discrimination
in the past suggests that the real purpose of the program was not to
remedy past discrimination.180 It is even not enough for the government
to allege a compelling interest to remedy past, specific discrimination if
the government bases its evidence only on statistical disparities and
possible inferences that racial discrimination caused the disparities.181 In
order to remedy the effects of discrimination in government contracting,
the government must show “a significant statistical disparity between the
number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a
particular service and the number of such contractors actually
engaged.”182 Therefore, to comply with the principles set forth in
Croson, Minnesota and Nebraska should be required to demonstrate a
compelling interest, identifying specific groups that have been subject to
past discrimination and narrowly tailor its program to remedy those
effects of past discrimination.
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit failed to adequately address its
reasons for allowing a state to adopt Congress’s compelling interest. The
court argued that the “[c]ompelling government interest looks at a statute
or governmental program on its face. When the program is federal, the
inquiry is (at least usually) national in scope.”183 The Eighth Circuit
cited no authority for its conclusion,184 likely because it is contrary to
Croson and Adarand III.185

179 See id. at 505–06 (“To accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to
competing claims for ‘remedial relief’ for every disadvantaged group . . . . We think such
a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision whose
central command is equality.”); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (“This Court never has held that
societal discrimination alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the
Court has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such
discrimination.”).
180 Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
181 Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1031 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
182 Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
183 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 2003).
184 Id.
185 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
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C. The Ninth Circuit had Proper Application, But a Flawed Explanation
The Ninth Circuit’s language limited itself to a narrow tailoring
analysis of Washington’s DBE program, but also articulated a
compelling interest, sufficient to meet the strict scrutiny analysis
requirement of Croson and Adarand III. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit’s
narrow tailoring analysis required evidence of past discrimination in
order to survive constitutional attack.186
The court stated that
Washington need not set forth a compelling interest for its DBE program
independent of that identified by the federal government.187 But in its
review, the Ninth Circuit required Washington to show that there was a
need to apply a compelling interest in the state.188
The Ninth Circuit required a showing of past discrimination in
order to survive constitutional attack.189 The court stated that narrow
tailoring “depends upon the presence or absence of discrimination in the
State’s transportation contracting industry.”190 The court further stated,
“[i]f no such discrimination is present in Washington, then the State’s
DBE program does not serve a remedial purpose; it instead provides an
unconstitutional windfall to minority contractors solely on the basis of
their race . . . .”191 This articulation of narrow tailoring was actually a
compelling interest illustration. The compelling interest inquiry is an
examination of the rationale for the state or entity to enact its program—
in other words, “assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough . . . .”192 Thus, the Ninth Circuit conflated the narrow
tailoring and compelling interest requirements of strict scrutiny.
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s confusing language, the result was
sound. In its analysis, the court reviewed the Washington program and
determined that WSDOT did not have a compelling interest for
implementing its program because Washington failed to offer sufficient
evidence of past discrimination in the transportation contracting
industry.193 This meant Washington did not narrowly tailor its program
and thus, was unconstitutional.194 While the court used narrow tailoring
language to find that the program was not constitutional, its actual
holding was based on the fact that the state had no compelling interest to
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187
188
189
190
191
192
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W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. DOT, 407 F.3d 983, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id. at 997–98.
Id.
Id.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
W. States Paving Co., 407 F.3d at 1002.
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implement its program because there was no evidence of past
discrimination.195
D. The Supreme Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny as Articulated in
Croson and Adarand III
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a party
can bring an as-applied constitutional challenge of a state’s DBE
program implemented pursuant to SAFETEA-LU. If the case were to
come before the Supreme Court, it should allow these challenges. The
Court should comply with its precedential Croson/Adarand III strict
scrutiny approach. Strict scrutiny is necessary to ensure governments
treat all persons equally as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.196 In the words of Justice
Scalia, “[w]hen we depart from this American principle we play with
fire.”197
The Court requires strict scrutiny because it is skeptical of
affirmative action programs and the stigmatic harm that arises when the
government creates classifications based on race.198
Race-based
programs may reinforce stereotypes, aggravating the premise that certain
racial groups are unable to achieve success without assistance, based on
information that has no connection to individual merit.199 Furthermore,
the Court is concerned that it is inequitable to force an innocent person to
bear the burden of redressing a wrong that he or she did not commit.200
Those individuals who think that racial preferences “even the score” do
not further the goal of equality, but rather hinder the view of one
195

Id.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state action
only. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection claims based on federal action are
derived from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution which provides, in
pertinent part, that “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Even though the Fifth Amendment “is
not as explicit a guarantee of equal treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment,” the
Supreme Court held that there is no distinction between claims brought under either of
the two Amendments. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200,
213–14 (1995).
197 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 223. Justice O’Connor noted that the “Court’s cases
through Croson had established three general propositions with respect to governmental
racial classification,” one of which was skepticism. Id. She noted that the Court is
skeptical of governmental racial classifications and thus, “[a]ny preference based on
racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination.” Id.
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986)); see also Croson,
488 U.S. at 493.
199 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
200 Id.
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American race because this ideal reinforces injustice in our society.201
For example, evening the score allows the government to compensate for
its discrimination against a black man by discriminating against a white
man the next time, but this process only creates perpetual discrimination,
which still violates the principles of equal protection.202 Thus, unless a
government reserves racial classifications for remedying a specific past
wrong, the classifications may promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a government of racial hostility.203
But affirmative action programs are not per se unconstitutional.204
Rather, “[t]he unacceptable vice is simply selecting or rejecting [persons]
on the basis of their race.”205 Affirmative action programs can be
successful when the government creates a program aimed at assisting the
disadvantaged generally, because this type of program does not violate
the Constitution.206 A race-neutral program does not take race into
consideration and thus, does not violate equal protection.207 On the other
hand, when the government creates a race-conscious affirmative action
program, our equal protection jurisprudence requires reviewing courts to
analyze those racial classifications under strict scrutiny.208 The Supreme
Court’s concern is that if strict scrutiny is not applied, the court has “no
way of determining . . . what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.209 The
“purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”210
1. A State Must Exhibit its Own Compelling Interest
Strict scrutiny requires an analysis to determine if the actor
implemented its program narrowly to further compelling governmental
201 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (The problem is that it was not
“blacks, or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but that it was individual men
and women, created equal, who were discriminated against . . . .”).
202 See id.
203 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
204 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 343 (2003). The University of Michigan
Law School’s educational diversity program, which took race into consideration for
admission decisions, survived strict scrutiny because the school reviewed each applicant
as an individual, taking various factors into consideration, not just race, in order to
achieve its goal of attaining a diverse student body. Id.
205 Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 156 (1979).
206 Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
207 Id.
208 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (Adarand III), 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
209 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
210 Id.
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interests.211 The court must first analyze the state’s asserted compelling
interest before determining whether the state narrowly tailored its
program and complied with SAFETEA-LU and its regulations.212
Absent evidence of this past discrimination for remediation, the resulting
program is per se unconstitutional.213 A state must exhibit its own
compelling interest and cannot rely on a federal compelling interest.
In regards to SAFETEA-LU, the federal government bases its
compelling interest for implementing SAFETEA-LU on a Congressional
report identifying widespread intentional discrimination in the
contracting industry.214
Because the federal government found
widespread discrimination and not discrimination in each individual
state, each state or other local recipient of federal funds must “possess
evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of
prior discrimination” in order to take remedial action.215 Each state
“must identify that discrimination, public or private, with some
specificity before they may use race conscious relief.”216 Therefore, in
accordance with Adarand III and Croson, a state or other recipient of
SAFETEA-LU federal funds must identify its own pattern of
discrimination before implementing a race-conscious DBE program.
2. Narrow Tailoring is More Than an Analysis of Compliance with
SAFETEA-LU Regulations
If a state or local government can justify a compelling interest for
its race-based program, the next step is to determine if the state narrowly
tailored its program to achieve those compelling interests.217 “The
purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement is to ensure that the means
chosen ‘fit’ the compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.”218 A court’s analysis of narrow tailoring
includes the review of a number of factors: “the necessity for the relief
211

Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227.
Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (“[I]t is almost impossible to assess whether the
Richmond plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked
to identified discrimination in any way.”).
213 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 511.
214 Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. DOT, 345 F.3d 964, 970–71 (8th Cir. 2003).
215 Croson, 488 U.S. at 504; accord Major Patricia C. Bradley, ARTICLE: Affirmative
Action or Passive Participation in Perpetuating Discrimination? The Future of RaceBased Preferences in Government Contracting, 2008 ARMY LAW 24, 38 (2008) (noting
that the holdings of W. States Paving and Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 910 (1996) require
the states to conduct their own separate studies to demonstrate a compelling interest).
216 Croson, 488 U.S. at 504.
217 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 227 (1995).
218 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
212

442

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 7:417

and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of
relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the relationship of
the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties.”219 The first factor requires analysis
of race-neutral alternatives.220 The second factor requires the program to
be appropriately limited such that it “will not last longer than the
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.”221 The Supreme Court
should apply these factors in order to determine if the state narrowly
tailored its DBE program.
Justice Scalia has made persuasive arguments for a narrow tailoring
analysis. Justice Scalia sets forth the notion of one American race, which
is consistent with the Court’s overall equal protection principles. He
argued that the only way a state can act by race to ameliorate the effects
of past discrimination is to eliminate a state’s system of unlawful race
discrimination.222 Thus, if in the past, a state had a program that did
differentiate based on race, the state may adopt a race-conscious remedy
in order to correct this unlawful discrimination.223 But, once that
problem is fixed and the state has established a racially diverse
workforce, the government may no longer use a race-conscious remedy
and must discontinue its race-based program.224
Employing these principles in the context of government
contracting, if there is evidence of unlawful discrimination, the states can
develop a program, like the SAFETEA-LU disadvantaged business
enterprise program, to correct the unlawful discrimination.225 After a
state identifies a compelling interest for implementing a race-conscious
DBE program, the state must narrowly tailor that program to ensure the
program only remedies discrimination of those racial and ethnic groups
that have been discriminated against in the past.226 Once the state has
remedied this discrimination, the state must discontinue its raceconscious program.227
219

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
See Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 237–38 (“To remedy prior discrimination, narrow
tailoring requires consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority
business participation in contracting.”); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (“[T]here does
not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase
minority business participation in city contracting.”).
221 Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 237–38 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)).
222 Croson, 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J. concurring).
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Each of the aforementioned circuits included in its narrow tailoring
analysis a determination of whether the state’s DBE program complied
with SAFETEA-LU (as TEA-21) and the related USDOT regulations.228
But this is not enough. The SAFETEA-LU regulations provide sufficient
flexibility to recipients, which must be monitored to ensure equal
protection rights are not violated.229 For example, while SAFETEA-LU
encourages states to set aside ten percent of federal funds for
economically and socially disadvantaged individuals, the regulations
specify that this ten percent amount is merely “aspirational” in nature.230
Furthermore, in determining the overall base figure for the relative
availability of DBEs, the regulations offer several options, but do not
limit the goal setting to one of the numerated options.231 As a result of
this flexibility, a recipient may choose a method, albeit prescribed by the
regulation, that may not be narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling
interest. In other words, in merely complying with the federal
regulations, states may apply a facially constitutional law in an
unconstitutional manner.
For example, if a court were to review a state’s program only to
determine if it complied with the regulations, the Washington DBE
program in Western States Paving would have survived constitutional
challenge. USDOT approved the WSDOT program, finding it complied
with the regulations.232 The court acknowledged that Washington’s DBE
program closely tracked the program developed by the USDOT.233 If the
Ninth Circuit stopped here, acknowledging that WSDOT complied with
the regulations, WSDOT’s program would have survived constitutional
attack. But, the court took its analysis one step further, finding that
Washington did not evidence past discrimination in its transportation
contracting
industry,
thereby
finding
WSDOT’s
program
234
unconstitutional.
Without determining if a state narrowly tailored its
program to remedy past discrimination, the overall goal of equal
protection would be frustrated. Thus, a court’s narrow tailoring analysis
should be more than a mere examination to determine if the state
complied with the federal regulations. The court should further
determine if the state employed race-neutral measures where possible
and limited its program in time such that the program only lasts long
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230
231
232
233
234

See supra Parts III.A, B, C.
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enough to remedy continuing effects of discrimination.235 This is the
only way a government program can narrowly tailor an affirmative
action program to survive strict scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
A party alleging a state’s unconstitutional application of a DBE
program pursuant to SAFETEA-LU regulations is met with a different
approach depending on if the party brings suit in the Seventh, Eighth, or
Ninth Circuit. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits allow as-applied
challenges to a state’s DBE program and focus their inquiry on the
narrow tailoring aspect of strict scrutiny. The Seventh Circuit precludes
an as-applied challenge, and instead limits its review to whether the state
complied with the federal regulations. None of these approaches are
constitutionally sound.
The Supreme Court should clarify the Croson/Adarand III standard
as required for state-implemented DBE programs based on federal
regulation. A state DBE program, pursuant to SAFETEA-LU, is not
immune from constitutional attack, but rather must be subject to strict
scrutiny analysis in line with Croson and Adarand III. To comply with
this strict standard articulated by the Supreme Court, a state or other
government recipient of SAFETEA-LU federal funds must exhibit a
compelling interest, separate from that of Congress, by identifying its
own pattern of discrimination before implementing a race-based
program. Additionally, the narrow tailoring aspect of strict scrutiny can
include a review of the state’s compliance with the SAFETEA-LU
regulations, but the analysis should not end here. The court should also
review to ensure the method chosen by the state corresponds to its
compelling goal so narrowly that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was based on factors of race. This requires
the use of race-neutral alternatives and a program that is limited in time
such that it will only remain in effect to remedy the continual effects of
past racial discrimination. This is the only way to ensure that federal,
state, and local governments treat all persons as American, the only race
acknowledged by the United States Constitution.

235 Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1031 (2003) (Scalia, J.
dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).

